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This paper builds on case work done with a major logistics operator - Exe1 Logistics - a 
company that has grown very quickly from launch in 1989 to become a leading force in both 
domestic and overseas contract distribution. Beginning with the evolution of the company, 
the paper moves on to examine problems faced by the parent company (NFC) and Exe1 
Logistics’ subsequent launch as an umbrella brand for all its distribution activity. Exe1 
Logistics’ strategies for international growth are outlined and questions posed as to its future 
direction. 
It is impossible to address the development of a single company in isolation therefore a 
second Working Paper, currently in review (The Changing Marketplace for Distribution: 
Implications for Exe1 Logistics), places the problems faced by NFC and Exe1 Logistics in 
context. It will examine how the UK, and to some extent the European and international 
marketplace for logistics and distribution has, and is continuing to change, over the same 
period of time. This allows for a broader examination of Exe1 Logistics’ strategic direction in 
the light of a discussion of current trends within the industry. 
Exe1 Logistics has grown to be a market leader in distribution and supply chain services in 
less than 5 years. It is the major operating division of National Freight Corporation (NFC) 
Plc, a FTSE 100 company listed on the London and American stock exchanges. With a 
turnover of almost f600 million in 1992, Exe1 Logistics operates 3,700 vehicles, 1.6 million 
sq meters of warehousing and almost a million cu meters of cold storage capacity. Its 
companies employ over 14,600 staff and operate over 220 distribution centres across the UK, 
mainland Europe and North America. Independent research carried out in 1991 confirmed 
Exe1 Logistics as UK market leader for contract distribution services, a goal reached well 
within the 3 year target set at launch in 1989. The company describes itself as “a successful 
business that has grown out of a previously unsuccessful state owned parent company”. 
BACKGROUNDANDBUYOUT 
The National Freight Corporation (NFC), Exe1 Logistics’ parent company, has its origins in 
post-war Labour Government policies aimed at nationalising transport in the UK and in 
1979 the Conservative Government began its privatisation programme with NFC. The sale 
was scheduled for 1981 with an anticipated capital price of f50-55 million, but due to the 
recession, postponement was advised. However, an alternative plan was put forward by the 
management and employees, who under the direction of Sir Peter Thompson and with the 
backing of multinational investors secured an employee buyout. NFC was sold into private 
ownership for f53.5 million in February 1982 - it was the UK’s first and some would say, 
its most successful privatisation. 
More than 10,000 employees, directors, pensioners and their families came up with the 
capital for 82.5% of the ordinary shares. Privatisation gave management the freedom to 
decide the company’s future strategy, in addition employee motivation and commitment was 
undoubtedly a key factor in its subsequent turnaround and also an important selling point, as 
customers believed they received better service when the employees owned the company. 
Prior to 1982, NFC’s financial performance was poor, but after the buyout it quickly became 
very successful, partly because as it was the old road part of British Rail, it had property to 
sell or redevelop (stations and land close to the railways). The charismatic leadership of Sir 
Peter Thompson was another important advantage. He created the possibility and then reality 
of broad employee ownership and went on to instil a unique employee participative company 
culture which has been integral in the success of the company. Post 1982, NFC experienced 
rapid growth and in preparation for its flotation on the Stock Exchange in 1989 was 
restructured into 4 divisions; Distribution, Transport, Home Services and Property and 
Travel. This followed a decision to refocus the previously separate distribution functions 
based on a stronger single brand image worldwide. 
The enlarged NFC Distribution Division was put under the control of a new MD Robbie 
Burns, who, along with Sales and Marketing Director, Martyn Pellew, were faced with the 
difficult task of reorganising, pruning and bringing marketing input to an assortment of 
companies acquired after this restructuring. The original portfolio of companies that 
comprised the NFC Distribution group consisted of a mixed bag of 7 brands selling a similar 
service to broadly similar market sectors (see below). In addition there were those companies 
transferred from the Special Services Group on January 1st (1989) and one overseas 
acquisition, Dauphin (N. America). Some of these companies were-growing, some were in 
trouble and many had overlapping products, services and markets. 
THE COMPANIES 
1. SPD - Unilever’s SPD, originally Speedy, Prompt Delivery, rechristened Solutions 
for Physical Distribution, was bought by NFC in January 1985 but it had 
very little awareness in the marketplace. Due to surplus capacity, very high 
costs and the need to increase earnings and/or reduce overheads, SPD had 
already begun to undertake third party work. Therefore, NFC had bought 
SPD plus contracts with other client companies who had “contracted in”. It 
was a network operation selling ambient distribution to grocery manufacturers 
and offered multi-location, multi-client distribution and warehousing, in 
effect shared distribution - at a time when the UK trend was moving towards 
dedicated distribution services. The company was financially haemoraging and 
badly needed “a good dose of marketing”. 
2. Carrycare - part of SPD concerned with non-grocery product manufacturers, such as 
TV’s and china items. 
3. NFC Contract Distribution. - This was previously the warehouse/storage contract arm of 
a sister NFC company, BRS, now moving from transportation into contract 
distribution and warehouse provision. With clients such as Sainsburys and 
Mars it was growing rapidly. Its target market was grocery clients, both 
manufacturers and retailers and the company offered a dedicated contract 
based service, ie one client, one warehouse. 
4. BDS(Bar Distribution Services formed in 1983). This was a joint venture formed solely 
for distribution to Whitbread trade outlets. 
5. Chillflow - launched in 1988 this was a special operation dedicated to Van den Berghs 
and Jurgens, market leader in manufacturing margarines, fats and edible oils. 
6. GDL - In 1986 GDS and ADL were acquired, they amalgamated and became GDL. 
This confectionery manufacturers distribution operation was sinking but not 
as fast as SPD. It was a network of multi-client warehouse locations, selling 
its service to confectionery manufacturers like Terry’s and Bassetts. 
7. Alpine Refrigerated Distribution - This consisted of Little ’ Alpine, the in-house 
distribution operation for Findus and Lyons Maid plus the Bird’s Eye/Walls 
operation, also bought out from Unilever. They merged to form Alpine - 
NFC’s temperature controlled distribution brand. Alpine sold frozen and 
chilled distribution via a network operation to grocery manufacturers. The 
company was in trouble. Temperature controlled distribution was also feeling 
the effect of the changing patterns of retailers distribution requirements. It 
was operating at over capacity and was looking for risk free contract business. 
Cold stores, being a fixed resource are very expensive to run and therefore to 
fill capacity they would have to consider both dedicated and non- contract 
business. 
At this point, these businesses had annual sales of f 160 million, with only NFC Contract 
Distribution making money. There was some degree of overlap in target markets with one or 
more of the others, for example, in distribution for confectionery manufacturers NFC 
Contract Distribution and GDL would compete and when Mars launched its ice cream range, 
so would NFC Contract Distribution and Alpine. This intra-competition was one result of 
the change in company culture after the buyout. Different parts of the organisation were 
competing head to head in the marketplace for business. This was encouraged by 
management who felt that as all their companies needed to make a profit, there was a better 
chance of winning a contract if they could put in perhaps 3 quotes by different “brands” to 
prospective clients. However, since all competing brands within NFC had broadly the same 
cost structure and overheads eg personnel, pension, wage rates, they were basically unable to 
differentiate on price or quality. BRS, Exe1 Logistics and Lynx being positioned on top of 
each other in the marketplace were unable to outdo each other because of these constraints. 
This was potentially confusing for clients and has been an issue that has proved difficult to 
resolve. They still compete today to some extent. 
After January 1989 the Distribution Division also acquired the following companies from the 
now dissolved NFC Special Services Group:- 
Fashionflow - a dedicated contract distribution service on boxed garments for Marks and 
Spencer. 
Masterspeed - again for Marks and Spencer, delivering furniture products direct to 
consumers homes. 
NCCS - National Carriers Contract Services. The original parcels business had been 
separately relaunched with another NFC subsidiary, Roadline as LYNX - the 
rest of the business came to the Distribution Division: Customers were mainly 
industrial manufacturers and variety product retailers, such as Woolworths. 
Newsflow - undertook newspaper distribution mainly for the Mirror Group. DMS (the 
UK’s largest independent book distributors) was acquired in May 1990 and 
reflected increasing diversification into other aspects of media distribution. 
Tempco Union - this was a joint venture with Union International (1984). A cold storage 
business, again with too much cold store capacity, they would be competing 
with Alpine in frozen distribution. 
Dauphin Distribution Services (USA) - Bought in 1987, this was NFC’s first overseas 
distribution acquisition. Serving mainly grocery manufacturers it was left to 
stand alone as it was running profitably. 
It was initially hoped that improved marketing would solve the problems of the loss making 
operations but it soon became apparent that SPD for example, had very little chance of 
becoming successful as it stood - few companies were buying what they had on offer and 
the base operational costs were high. NFC saw the future in contract distribution and 
therefore wanted to bias its product offering towards the successful NFC Contract 
Distribution element of the product portfolio. Detailed analysis begun on the markets, 
customers and positioning of each of the different brand offerings. In addition the business 
wanted to develop abroad, both in the USA and mainland Europe. NFC’s aim was to launch 
“a new company” on the back of the high profile February 1989 Stock Exchange flotation. 
THE NAMING ISSUE 
When Martyn Pellew, the Marketing Director, joined NFC in August 1987 (5 years after the 
buyout and pre-floatation) very little in terms of established marketing existed and the 
brands had been operating as separate elements for some time. He had now acquired 13 
“brands” and differentiation was essential. They still overlapped at various levels and the 
detailed work of analysing the marketing problems took place from August to December 
1987. It was initially felt that the obvious solution was to bring the companies together 
under the NFC name and then work on targeted sector marketing. But NFC was to be 
withdrawn by the parent company as a trading name and so they faced a difficult decision. 
They could not relaunch with the NFC name and none of the existing brands were well 
enough known to stand alone, plus there was the internal problem of making a “winner” 
from the existing portfolio and the others feeling that they had “lost” - management also felt 
that the raw material for a successful new brand was not there. They had to have a new 
name. The vision was to use the power of the truck fleet - united under one brand name to 
gain market leadership, increase visibility and therefore brand recognition, but this had to be 
built from scratch. In December 1987 work began with a market research agency to compile 
facts, figures and statistics in preparation for launching under a new name. 
The research was done in phases:- 
Phase one:- The first phase was aimed at confirming that the status quo was unacceptable 
and that a new brand needed to be established, based on an understanding of customer 
needs. Distribution customers were asked exactly what they wanted to buy plus their 
opinions about what was already on offer from competitors. The main finding was that 
demand was for a quick, fast, accurate, reliable, national service. It also confirmed that 
customers seldom bought geographically or by product but rather by sector, and thus that 
there were three ways that the problem of marketing could be approached: 
i. 
ii. 
- 
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Geographically, like BRS, BRS Western, BRS Southern. This was discounted because 
it was felt that buyers now wanted national solutions to their distribution needs, they 
no longer wanted to buy, for example, just Scottish distribution. 
Divide the market by product/service - shared distribution; contract hire; network 
distribution etc. This too was discounted as it was found that customers tended not 
to differentiate - they wanted to buy distribution as a @&I solution - or “one stop 
shopping”. 
Marketing by sector - defined as a group of buyers who act in a similar fashion and 
have similar distribution needs, in simplest terms sectors are split into retailers and 
manufacturers and then into food and non-food. 
Phase Two:- This took the form of brainstorming on the findings, using possible brand 
words to convey meaning. Around 200 possibilities were put into five categories and 
eliminated until approx six in each category remained, eg one category was initials, another 
speed words etc. Eventually most popular words were EXACT, BEST, ACCURATE, 
DIRECT AND QUALITY. At this stage they were always used with the description word 
distribution, logistics was not yet in the picture. 
Phase three:- The words in the five categories were market tested in order to establish 
which received the most positive response. It was felt to be important to stress “exact and 
quality”. They decided to go on Excel and then changed this to Exe1 Distribution, Sir Peter 
Thompson suggested Logistics - this was the real gamble as the term was not widely used in 
the UK at the time. The name was tested in six countries, Spain, France, Holland, Germany, 
UK and USA and the positive overall response allowed the company to be launched as Exe1 
Logistics. 
Phase four:- The new name had to be registered and decisions taken on graphic treatments, 
colours and logo. There were problems with engineers over vehicle colours as dark colours 
led to insulation problems on temperature regulated vehicles. Eventually it was decided that 
the livery would be blue letters on a metallic silver background, emphasising a high 
technology and quality image while still meeting insulation requirements. 
Exe1 Logistics had arrived. Launched in May 1989, it was to be an umbrella brand for all 
NFC’s distribution, warehousing and transport interests and would emphasise the importance 
of the strategic management of the whole supply chain, including;- 
- the transfer of information between interdependent but separate parties within it, 
- the flow and storage of raw materials, parts and finished inventory, 
- transfer to and from manufacturing plants, 
- finished goods storage, 
- delivery to customers, including home delivery if required. 
Contracts with customers would include all or part of the above, from the provision of 
warehousing - even design and building - through all operational aspects, to final delivery. 
ADVERTISING 
The name would be used by each operating company in its targeted market sector and would 
draw together a wide spectrum of international distribution and warehousing activities - the 
aim being to become market leader and a global player. It achieved immediate, spontaneous 
awareness of approx 10% in just 6 weeks. By bringing the businesses together under a single 
brand Exe1 Logistics aimed to satisfy a growing world wide demand among retailers and 
manufacturers for an integrated approach to their supply chain needs - regionally, nationally 
and internationally. Brand communication emphasised industrial sectors or market areas. This 
was reinforced by extensive (targeted) advertising which pushed the high technology element 
of the company. Three months after the launch, spontaneous awareness had risen to almost 
30% and prompted awareness to over 90%. It was quickly becoming recognised as a high 
technology logistics company. 
It was important to launch as a single brand. Although it was a new name, Exe1 Logistics 
had a healthy parent company and a high profile client base. A week before the launch, 
prospective clients were sent an unidentified poster of a silver truck, in a silver tube, with 
no sender’s name or address - a week later they were sent a full explanation along with 
adverts and details of the new company. \ 
Marketing a service brand is ail about image and perception and Martyn Pellew believes that 
“perception is reality”. Exe1 Logistics’ adverts have been very important in getting their 
image across to customers. The first one “Born to Lead” showed the silver truck, a high 
technology image with foreign flags (even though they only had one overseas acquisition at 
the time) and built on the credibility of NFC. Follow up adverts under a “Computer man” 
theme pushed the company as being at the leading edge of logistics and technology. Within a 
year the company became concerned that the earlier adverts were too impersonal and issued 
an advertisement with a person in to indicate warmth and service. In 1991 Exe1 Logistics 
advised the Russian Government on food distribution, this was good PR and they issued new 
adverts to draw attention to it. They were now building on internationalisation which was 
becoming a reality following acquisitions in Spain, Germany, Holland and France as well as 
the USA. 
.- 
- 
COMPETITION AND POSITIONING 
Distribution is a low margin business and companies have to aim high on quality and 
therefore price, to be able to carry the overheads, thus to be successful they have to be at 
the premium end. By 1992 Exe1 Logistics had over 200 depot locations, its nearest 
competitors by size are the contract distribution element of TDG (a group like NFC) and 
Tibbett and Brittain. However, the main marketplace competitor in image and awareness is 
TNT, who are perceived to be leaders across all market sectors. They are highly visible and 
the largest competitor in non-food distribution, eg newspapers and automotive parts. Being a 
parcels operator as well as in distribution, TNT can compete as one brand against NFC’s 
three brands, Exe1 Logistics, Lynx and BRS combined. Exe1 Logistics chose to position 
themselves against TNT on all levels, eg in being more willing to talk to the press and even 
in creating subsidiaries. TNT were identified as having 67 different companies, proliferating 
brands at a rapid rate - many of them possibly lacking credibility. Exe1 Logistics’ policy is 
to consider creating separately targeted teams only if all clients in the sector bring over, say 
f25 million worth of business in one year or if revenue from any one customer exceeds for 
example, f 10 million. They would then create a dedicated company with a whole business 
team, such as Exei Logistics - Storeflow for the Storehouse contract gained in 1988. 
STRUCTURE OF EXEL LOGISTICS (UK) 
When Exe1 Logistics was launched, the constituent companies were being asked to change 
into something that did not exist, thus there was a certain amount of internal resistance. 
They had to work on establishing group and team identities within the company and 
operationalised a three-way organisational split:- 
.- 
i. Exe1 Logistics Grocery and Leisure - SPD and Carrycare merged and then closed, as 
did GDL, so this team was built mainly from NFC Contract Distribution, BDS and 
Chillflow. The business focus was on serving the grocery, catering and drinks market 
sectors and the customers were mainly food and drink producers and retailers. 
Exe1 Logistics Consumer and Industrial - this comprised of NCCS and other non- 
food elements, including Newsflow and Fashionflow. Customers ranged from 
consumer product retailers and manufacturers to a cross section of industrial product 
manufacturers and distributors such as Vauxhall, BMW, Woolworths and Argos. 
Exe1 Logistics Temperature Controlled Services - this alliance of Tempco Union and 
Alpine Refrigerated Deliveries covered all chilled and frozen distribution. Operating 
as Exe1 Logistics TCS this division worked closely with (and generated specialist 
business from) the food and grocery divisions within the company. It soon became 
market leader in the distribution of chilled and frozen food with a fleet of 500 
vehicles, 27 depots and 2300 staff. With the expansion of the UK chill food market 
they turned a number of existing cold storage facilities into chilled distribution 
ii. 
- 
. . . 
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centres for short life products. This improved the financial performance of TCS and 
the division was back in profit by 1991. 
These 3 business groups were in force until mid-1992 when, after further growth, they were 
reorganised and split into four management teams, the main change occurring with the 
amalgamating of Grocery and Leisure into Exe1 Logistics Grocery. With total revenue 
exceeding f300 million pa, retail and manufacturer grocery distribution was split between 
two internal management teams but with one external sales and marketing team. This new 
business unit now controlled all food distribution; retailer, manufacturer, ambient and 
temperature controlled, including Exe1 Logistics Chillflow (dedicated to one client) and was 
felt to be consistent with marketplace requirements. 
UK 
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Exe1 Logistics Industrial now encompassed Exe1 Logistics Newsflow (distributing 70% of 
UK nationals, Guardian, Mirror, Daily Mail and regionals) and DMS (rebranded Exe1 
Logistics Media Services in 1992) with a f54 million turnover. DMS built on the base of 
newspaper distribution and worked towards market leadership in all print media distribution. 
To some extent Exe1 Logistics Industrial is a catch all, with a wide series of subsectors and 
targeted marketing, directed at ensuring that potential customers in those subsectors, such as 
electronics or automotive, are aware of Exe1 Logistics’ presence. 
Exe1 Logistics Consumer, the non-food retail division includes Fashionflow and Storeflow 
having contracts with DIY and department stores including Comet, Woolworths, Superdrug, 
Boots, BHS, Habitat, Marks and Spencer and Mothercare. 
The marketing for the company however, continued as if there were still just thre 
sectors; Grocery, Industrial and Consumer, with all new business development effort 
contained within three sales teams. 
- STRATEGIC DIRECTIONS FOR EXEL LOGISTICS 
By 1990 NFC/Exel Logistics had reached a point where the options were either to seek 
greater penetration in the home market via new market segments or look to expand overseas. 
In the home market they could either:- 
a) seek to develop new market sectors. As Exe1 Logistics* new businesses were 
previously predominantly food and retailer based, they could try to open up new 
sectors where they were not strong eg petrochemicals or pharmaceuticals or 
b) develop new services within the food sector. Their existing strength lay with ambient 
and frozen food distribution (a static market) whilst the chill food sector was 
growing. 
(P 
This second option seemed to provide a potential opportunity. More and more outlets were 
selling fresh dairy produce, yoghurts and short life products. By effectively altering the 
temperature control systems in existing cold stores, Exe1 Logistics could easily facilitate a 
move into this sector. 
BACKGROUND TO THE FROZEN FOOD MARKET 
The easiest distribution area for market sector monitoring is the frozen market because cold 
storage capacity is registered (Lloyd’s Register) and can be easily measured. Three years ago 
extra marketplace capacity was added as Tesco and Asda built their own distribution 
- 
composites (multi-temperature warehouses) which included chilled and frozen storage. They 
were thereby removing products which had previously been in other peoples storage capacity 
and putting them into their own, thus adding to available capacity even though the frozen 
food market had stopped growing. In addition, cold stores had been built or added to the 
market specifically to meet demand for EC intervention stocks. This boom time for the 
industry had increased capacity from 160 to 200 million cu ft, but after 1986 changes in the 
Government’s Common Agricultural Policy meant that intervention stocks were being 
withdrawn from the beef and butter mountains and overall market demand for storage fell 
to around 180 million cu ft. These two factors had increased total frozen storage capacity to 
220 million. With demand down by 10% and capacity up by 10% - the result was severe 
over-capacity in the market and fierce price competition. This was tackled by cold storage 
providers reducing storage rates to attract new business and seeking alternative types of 
contract, making it a very competitive sector. 
In the past NFC companies like Tempco Union and Alpine had profited by freezing and 
storing intervention stocks but because of external marketplace changes they had to suddenly 
shift and become more involved in stock movement - distribution rather than storage. Other 
major operators tried to stabilise the market by selling off their older, less efficient cold 
stores and moving over to the chill sector. This is an example of external market factors 
created by Government (EC) legislative change and European policy changing a marketplace. 
However, with an expanding chilled food market, there were opportunities to build market 
share even though competitors already existed, eg Unigate (UCD) and Express 
Dairies/Coldstream were manufacturer driven distribution systems and others like Northern 
Food Transport (NFT) were already strong in this sector. Five years ago companies like 
Christian Salvesen, Tempco Union and Alpine dealt with predominantly frozen produce and 
wanted to move into this high value-added area (with chilled produce being perishable, time 
becomes a saleable commodity). Exe1 Logistics wanted a share of this growing market. 
But, after examining the options, they returned to their initial vision, of being a truly 
international company, the problem was - how to get there! 
THE MOVE TO NORTH AMERICA 
By the late 1980’s NFC, recognising that they were still very dependent on domestic UK 
earnings, began to actively encourage all its companies to seek new business overseas. It was 
decided to expand via Exe1 Logistics in the USA first, partly because of the size and type of 
market but also as their only overseas acquisition so far was American (Dauphin). Expansion 
in the USA was a key element in the strategy to develop the brand internationally. The aim 
was to become the USA market leader in warehousing and logistics via services to global 
clients. In 1990, 25% of NFC’s profits were generated in the USA. alone - the new target 
was to achieve a 409/o-50% contribution from the USA and Europe by 1995. 
The market for the storage and distribution of goods in the USA was in essence very 
different from the UK market and took two forms:- 
a) short term provision of public warehousing on 30 day terms with no contracts, in 
effect a shared-user system. 
b) less common was contract warehousing, a dedicated system with 1 to 5 year contracts. 
The existing shared-user acquisition, Dauphin, was profitable and offered a convenient, 
high-margin service. This was opposite to that offered in the UK, where shared 
transport/storage was often a low-margin service. Dedicated warehousing in the States was 
not widespread and was perceived as low-margin for low risk. This cultural difference is 
-- 
- 
-- 
- 
-- 
important - it was wrong to assume that the UK system would be interchangeable, the 
strategy needed to be different and adapted to local conditions. 
Within the distribution industry, contract work provides greater security (linking customers 
into long-term contracts) and in the UK, Exe1 Logistics and NFC had formed disciplines of 
tight financial management and risk control, developing real strengths in this area. By 
moving to the States they sought to enhance the level of dedicated work but at the same 
time they continued to offer what the American market traditionally wanted - shared usage 
with 5 or 6 manufacturer’s loads being delivered into individual wholesaler’s or retailer’s 
stores or regional distribution centres with the ability to buy transport in from local full 
truck load (FTL) movers on overnight long distance runs. 
Dauphin Distribution Services was one of the largest warehousing and distribution businesses 
serving the food and grocery trades in the Mid-Atlantic region (clients included Procter and 
Gamble). The company had 3 million sq ft of warehousing at 12 locations with 600 
employees. This family owned company was seen as a natural partner for the employee 
owned NFC. Its successful acquisition encouraged further expansion and thus there evolved a 
multi-phased strategy for a conscious move to develop in the States. Dauphin gave Exe1 
Logistics a foothold in the US marketplace by delivering a range of consumer and 
manufacturers products into one of the largest population centres (about 80 million people 
on the N.E. Seaboard). Based 150 miles inland from New York, with relatively cheap labour 
and land costs, Dauphin’s complex of large scale warehouses were only an overnight trip 
from this highly populated area. They offered a consolidation service to manufacturers, with 
goods being stored, picked and moved directly to New York. Manufacturers were able to 
buy transport movements at FTL prices even though they may not have had a full load to be 
dropped at each delivery destination, again effectively shared distribution - exactly what the 
UK market was moving away from. 
With the decision to expand geographically, Exe1 Logistics did not ideally want to be 
acquisition led, but to gain the benefits of consolidation it was felt that this was the most 
likely strategy to succeed and generate critical operating mass in a number of other regions. 
Thus, it was first necessary to decide which other major population centres it was essential 
to be in and then determine which companies with at least 1 million sq ft of warehousing 
(preferably more) with several large clients, were potential acquisitions. It was not always 
easy to get a match between, what was available to acquire and what suited both the 
company culture and local market conditions. 
In 1989 Distribution Centres Inc (DCI) based in Columbus, Ohio was bought. This second 
acquisition was closer to the UK formula of a dedicated contract business. It was an 
entrepreneur led company with similar values to its new parent, distributing medical and 
office supplies, pharmaceuticals and consumer products practically nationwide. There were 
18 locations (some on the west coast and in the south) 5 million sq ft of warehousing and 
700 staff. DC1 gave Exe1 Logistics the opportunity to expand its dedicated business in the 
North American market and brought important key customers such as Du Pont, Lever and 
again Procter and Gamble. This acquisition was a well run company and provided an 
excellent complement to the operations of Dauphin. 
Pursuing its geographical strategy Exe1 Logistics concentrated on 5 main centres; the N. East; 
the Mid-West and Chicago; the S. East and Atlanta; the South (Texas and Dallas) and the 
West Coast (San Fransisco and Los Angeles). With 5 primary regional targets and perhaps 12 
sub-targets (Denver, St. Louis and Kansas etc) it was becoming very clear where they 
needed to be and what they wanted to buy. With dominance in the grocery/consumer 
manufacturing sectors, they could now either begin to look at new sectors or diversify 
within logistics services and investigate what other products/services could be beneficial 
complements, such as, warehousing, road transport or trucking. The next acquisition 
followed this line of thinking - a move into transport with Minute Man Delivery Systems 
(1990). This Boston based company undertook dedicated distribution across the USA, but 
mainly in the N.East and was 90°h contract backed. It had a turnover of $30 million and 
bought a different industrial client base with Toyota, Nissan and Chrysler. This move 
allowed Exe1 Logistics into new areas with automotive and business service clients (Minute 
Man also provided a dedicated paper moving service for, among others, several N. East local 
banks) even so, Minute Man was a low margin company. 
In 1991 the fourth American acquisition was Universal Terminal Warehouse Company 
(UTW) a Texas based local warehouse operation, mainly shared-use; in Dallas, Houston and 
San Antonio. With 5 warehouses, 670,000 sq ft of storage capacity and 150 staff, it 
distributed grocery, paper and health products as well as industrial and chemical products. It 
brought additional major client names to the international customer base like Philip Morris, 
Nestle and Colgate. This acquisition continued the strategic plan to develop from its already 
well established and profitable base in the North East across the USA through the Southern 
States into the West. 
In 1992 there were 2 more acquisitions. J H Coffman and Son Inc was a distribution and 
warehousing company based in Los Angeles. It was acquired to extend coverage to the west 
coast, the mid-west and Chicago. It had over 40 years experience in the healthcare, grocery 
and consumer product market with 375,000 sq ft of warehousing and 40 staff. 
- 
- 
In July Trammel1 Crow Distribution Corporation (TCDC) based in Dallas was bought. This 
contract warehousing business had 6 million sq ft of warehousing, 44 distribution centres, 
600 employees and a turnover of f27.6 million. As well as warehousing, the company was 
also involved in value-added services, including the management of interstate transportation 
and packaging operations. With business divided between consumer and industrial sectors, it 
gave access to the petrochemical sector, with clients like Exxon and Shell. James Watson, 
Chairman NFC commented; 
“This is a further important step in becoming the acknowledged leader in the 
provision of logistics services in N. America. It virtually completes our acquisition 
programme in the USA and sets the stage for a period of strong organic growth”.[l] 
These acquisitions may have been driven by geography but they also allowed Exe1 Logistics 
to enter into new market sectors. They now had a presence in 4 out of the 5 main regions, 
missing out in Atlanta (S.East) - where as no acquisition target matched the criteria, they set 
up a green-field operation by building warehousing for a core client (Reckitt and Coleman) 
with extra capacity for use by others on a new contract basis. 
Apart from Dauphin, all other acquisitions, DCI, Minute Man, UTW, Coffman, TCDC, fell 
within a 3 year period. Exe1 Logistics’ N.American headquarters was initially in Chicago, but 
now regional offices exist in Harrisburg, Atlanta and Dallas and the headquarters has moved 
to Columbus, Ohio. In 1991 the resultant organisation from the US acquisitions were divided 
into 3 operational units:- 
EXEL LOGISTICS - Grocery Services Inc. (was Dauphin) 
With its main focus on warehouse management for grocery, health and beauty 
products, it operates from 3 complexes in Pennsylvania with a total storage capacity 
460,000 sq mt. Major customers include US top brand suppliers: General Mills, 
Nabisco, Procter and Gamble. 
EXEL LOGISTICS - Dedicated Distribution (was Distribution Centres Inc) 
Also warehouse management based in Columbus Ohio, with 18 locations on south, 
west and east coasts of the USA. Dealing mainly with non-food products and 
multinational customers eg Lever Bros, Du Pont, Sharp Electronics. 
EXEL LOGISTICS - Dedicated Delivery Systems (was Minute Man) 
Provides a portfolio of products and services based on the physical transport side of 
the business, such as traffic management, vehicle supply and out of hours delivery. 
There are 500 vehicles serving 43 states and customers include Nissan and Chrysler. 
These acquisitions have created an organisation which is probably the leading logistics 
business in the USA with a turnover in excess of f 100 million, 18.5 million sq ft of storage, 
over 3000 employees and 600 vehicles. It provides a range of services to many market 
sectors, with customers including several Fortune 500 companies. The process has been 
strategically logical, evolving through acquisitions on a geographical basis, sometimes 
available companies were fitted into the strategy rather than being strategy led, eg Minute 
Man was made to fit because it was available for sale; although it broadened their product 
offer, it was not ideal at that stage of their strategic development. By the end of 1992 Exe1 
Logistics’ strategic acquisition programme in the USA was virtually complete with a presence 
in over 30 states. They now offer warehousing and/or transport in each of their 5 major 
target regions. In addition, by following contacts with important existing USA clients, Exe1 
Logistics have now also developed initial small operations in Mexico and Canada. 
In 1992 Exe1 Logistics - North America restructured and rebranded the original businesses 
acquired over the previous 3 years into 5 targeted market sectors each with individual 
business teams:- 
Retail, Consumer products, Health care, Industrial, Business Services. 
The bringing together of all these acquisitions in such a short period of time has been 
greatly assisted by the use of “Exelization”. This is the process of rebranding each unit 
behind the brand identity of Exe1 Logistics and the promotion of the company’s core values 
ie the principle working methodology that stands behind all Exe1 Logistics’ operations and 
employees. Exelization represents for these small US companies, a move from local family 
run businesses into an international company culture. 
(This process has been continued for European acquisitions and a more detailed discussion of 
the advantages and disadvantages can be found in Teaching Notes .currently being prepared 
for the two cases in ECCH). 
A new strategy utilising the now solid USA client base is for the company to follow those 
clients abroad using established links; eg Procter and Gamble to Mexico; Kelloggs into 
Canada and again they will use this as a base to expand. Also the Bermuda Drug Company 
(a retailer) has asked Exe1 Logistics to move into Bermuda. 
STRATEGY IN MAINLAND EUROPE. 
To meet increasing demand and customers changing needs from the creation of the 1993 
Single European Market (SEM), many distribution contractors felt they had to expand 
geographically and broaden their range of services along with, or preferably before, their 
customers. Operators targeted their efforts at market sectors they were best equipped to 
serve, which for Exe1 Logistics offered the prospect of exporting to the Continent the 
concept of dedicated distribution which they had developed so successfully in the UK retail 
.- 
- 
sector. And there did appear to be a market opportunity. Whilst the UK grocery market was 
already contracting out 70% of its distribution needs, in Germany and France the figure was 
only 15% [2]. 
Achieving UK market leadership by 1991 left Exe1 Logistics facing several strategic options. 
Following successful moves in the USA, it was decided that the strategy would be parallel 
development in mainland Europe, concentrating on the food/grocery sector. This was mainly 
because other industrial sectors where they lacked strength were already international 
markets dominated by major international players eg Shell, BASF, Ford. The food sector 
however, was determined more by local tastes, local retailing and local markets. Food 
distribution entails the movement of large, physically bulky products with relatively low 
value when compared to say cars or computers and tends to have been operated on a local, 
national basis rather than global or international. Food logistics was seen as “the art of the 
possible” for Exe1 Logistics. 
The arrival of the SEM acted as a stimulus for expansion and the company’s first step was to 
follow existing UK customers into new markets. They decided on a priority sequence of 
countries by looking at the geography, the economic stage of development, market prospects 
and where existing clients wanted to develop their business. The first opportunity arose with 
Marks and Spencer when Exe1 Logistics built a distribution centre for them at Evrey near 
Paris to serve their stores in France. This strategy was not enough on its own, but it did 
allow them to establish initial credibility in the country - a “footprint in the sand“. Although 
this was initially a low risk way to develop a pan-European operation, it soon became 
necessary to decide whether being credible to existing clients in new countries was enough 
(reactive expansion) or should they also begin to look both at other domestic companies 
wanting to expand overseas and at acquiring existing distribution businesses in new countries 
(proactive expansion). 
The initial strategy was for a country sequence, with Exe1 Logistics bringing its strengths to 
new markets. These strengths were in food/grocery and retail logistics for large companies 
like Tesco’s and Sainsburys in the UK. Again, the route of growth by acquisition in specific 
geographical areas was chosen and in 1991 the brand was launched first in Spain, then 
Germany, France and Holland, aiming to be number one in food manufacturing and retail 
distribution in Europe by 1995. They proceeded with the rapid acquisition of businesses, 
seeking small to medium sized but strategically important grocery distribution and 
warehousing companies. These were often family owned and required minimum investment 
on existing infrastructure since they were serving the needs of existing clients, although in 
new markets. 
Without a fully international capability, it made sense for Exel Logistics to go into mainland 
Europe selling national distribution to producers and market sectors that were purely 
national operators. It was the intention over time to string together a series of national food 
based networks that would ultimately form an international network as the European food 
market developed. There were already signs that it was changing as both manufacturers and 
retailers were crossing borders. Therefore Exe1 Logistics needed to become proactive and 
acquire businesses that would create this network in each country in sequence. (Each country 
would be run as a separate entity until it reached a certain size, later becoming more sector 
oriented as in the States). 
Overall, Exel Logistics’ policy has been to build on their successful development of 
dedicated distribution in the UK and to export it into mainland Europe, training where 
possible, local management. 
ACQUISITION CRITERIA 
The following criteria were adopted when looking for companies to acquire in the priority 
markets:- 
The company must be operating in one of Exel Logistics’ existing market sectors. 
Management must be capable of adopting Exel Logistics’ ideas for further 
development. 
They must be operating profitably. 
They had to have a strong client list, but with no one client being more than 25% of 
the revenue. 
The company’s management must wish to remain post-acquisition. 
Ideally the company’s clients should already have warehousing and/or distribution 
contracts. 
The only post-acquisition requirements were for regular monthly financial reporting, 
quarterly reviews of progress with the parent company management and agreement of the 
annual budget. Companies operate with a large degree of autonomy with day to day 
management remaining with their existing teams, at least initially. 
It is important in local acquisitions to buy local management. In the States, DC1 management 
was very good but some original senior people have now been replaced. Local company 
acquisition gives Exel Logistics credibility in each market/country and the following 
advantages:- 
continuity of supply - easier to win new clients 
acquisition of people with local market knowledge 
an existing client portfolio 
.- 
_- 
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established the Exel Logistics’ brand throughout Europe 
So the strategy was to - 
get into the correct geographical areas 
get into new sectors 
get into offering new/different services. 
Acquisitions were driven by geography but a by-product was being able to get into new 
product areas. 
SPAIN 
The first acquisition was Sadema (1990) - Spain’s third largest transport and distribution 
company. Turnover was f6.3 million, supplying chilled and ambient warehousing and 
distribution for leading Spanish food manufacturers from I5 locations. The business was 
owned by 4 manufacturers - in effect clients with long term contracts who had combined 
their operations. Sadema had national coverage, including the Balearic and Canary islands 
with I3 owned and 2 franchised operations. With large distances between population centres, 
Spain has few major international distribution operators, meaning in effect less competition 
than in France or Germany. Exe1 Logistics saw easy market entry, in a growth area, with 
low risk. The major competitor, a Unilever subsidiary called SAD, had recently been bought 
by Swiss owned Danzas. Unilever were actively pursuing a policy of outsourcing and seemed 
to be choosing a different third party operator in each country - Exe1 Logistics had 
previously acquired some of their distribution interests in the UK with SDP and Alpine. In 
Germany, Unilever had sold its frozen food business to Salvesen, another UK competitor. 
Exe1 Logistics had to decide what service to offer in the Spanish market. They wanted 
dedicated business using their existing expertise in warehouse management to gain secure 
profits, but as in the USA there was some reluctance in the market to buy this service and 
Spain’s physical size really required a network solution. However, since 1990 they have had 
some success in signing dedicated business with; Marks and Spencer expanding into Spain; 
Digsa, a Spanish grocery retailer and Olympus. It was still difficult to get across the British 
concept of this method of distribution, which is about offering nationwide delivery with 
economies of scale. Sadema was rebranded Exe1 Logistics - Iberica with its own corporate 
identity and image and is now one of Spains top three logistic companies. 
GERMANY 
The first German acquisition was Hellwe; Tiefkuhl (rebranded Exe1 Logistics Deutschland) 
in June 1991. A frozen product distribution company with trans-shipment operations, it had 
the ability to service all of Germany, including the old East, from a single cold storage 
centre near Dortmund in, at most 48 hours. It was almost a parcels style operation for frozen 
foods, a potential high added-value service. It fell within the buying criteria, a small family 
owned, low-risk food business, operating profitably. 
In Autumn 1991, Exel Logistics bought from the liquidators a food products and catering 
distribution company called Restaurant Services. Rebranded Exe1 Logistics - Restaurant 
Services it was to seek new business and operate contracts aimed at developing deliveries to 
the restaurant and catering market. However, difficult trading and recent adverse economic 
conditions have recently slowed business growth in Germany. The latest acquisition in 
January 1993 is a company called Macke and Son, another small family business, providing 
ambient food distribution for two clients within the grocery market. With net assets of f2.1 
million the company will operate from 59000 sq mt site with 130 staff and 64 vehicles. It 
has been rebranded Exel Logistics Cloppenburg from January 1st 1993. 
FRANCE 
October 1991 saw Exel Logistics’ first acquisition in France, BOS Finances. This chilled and 
frozen distribution family business was a market leader in the chilled sector. It operated in 
the north-west region under regional company names, STM, STB and Frimotrans and 
covered about one third of the country. Concentrating on chilled distribution for meat, 
cheese and fish produce, it offered a service based on speed and quality providing fast 
overnight transport. Clients included Carrefour and Intermarche. The network of 13 
temperature controlled locations gave Exe1 Logistics a sound geographical base, considering 
they already had the Fashionflow operation for Marks and Spencer near Paris. The new 
group continued to operate under the management of the Boucher family at the head 
quarters in Brittany, under the Exe1 Logistics - France brand name. The turnover was f I7 
million with 500 staff, 200 vehicles and 14,000 cu mts of warehouse capacity. 
In 1992 Sodiaal,a temperature controlled warehousing and distribution company was 
acquired (also a producer of regional cheeses). Based in the central French region of 
Clermont Ferrand it bought 24 staff, 50,000 sq ft of warehousing and IO vehicles to the 
company. 
HOLLAND 
In October 1991 Exel Logistics bought Food Express Intl BV, Holland’s largest independent 
food warehousing and distribution company, serving the Benelux countries. With a turnover 
of f7.3 million, 50 vehicles and 150 staff, it operated transport by owner drivers on a sub- 
contract basis. This was an ambient and chilled food distribution operation for grocery 
products operating from two centres covering all of Holland, with Unilever as a major 
client. Rebranded as Exe1 Logistics - Nederland it was an important entry point into 
Benelux. In 1992 Exel Logistics in Holland gained new contracts with Apple Computers and 
Texas Instruments, a move away from the food sector. 
- 
- 
- 
By the end of 1991 Exe1 Logistics had a capability over a large area of mainland Europe, 
with access to local markets and local expertise. They had therefore achieved their initial 
goal of entering priority geographical markets and had to decide on their next step. They 
could continue to build a presence in new countries like Austria and Portugal, proceed with 
further acquisitions in existing countries or slow down. Robbie Burns and Martyn Pellew 
advocated a period of consolidation. They decided to concentrate on their existing 
acquisitions, build on their initial presence, grow their businesses organically and get and 
develop the right people. 
Nothing new was bought until November 1992 when they acquired two more French 
regional distribution businesses, Transports Pujos and Transports Martin, in Toulouse and 
Nice. Like BOS both were family owned and provided specialist transport for long and short 
life chilled products for manufacturers, retailers and restaurants. When linked with BOS they 
gave 5 regional companies but not quite national coverage for frozen and chilled foods. 
Exel Logistics’ strategy at the end of 1992 was still not complete, they did not have 
credibility in all countries over all grocery product temperature ranges, the existing 
businesses offered;- 
Spain - ambient and chilled 
Germany - frozen and chilled only 
France - mainly chilled, some frozen 
Holland - mainly ambient. . 
Without networks at all temperature ranges, it would be impossible to link food networks 
between countries to become a true pan-European distributor. Even with this strategic gap, 
organic growth was beginning, new work was gained in both Spain and Holland. Where there 
was organic development, it tended to be in warehouse contracts rather than transportation 
which was often sub-contracted out to owner drivers. 
Exe1 Logistics have found that in mainland Europe most of the networked systems were not 
food oriented - but biased more towards industrial group haulage. The main pattern of 
movements were in a wide range of products without the hygiene, sanitation or temperature 
controlled requirements of food. The food sector required technical expertise and was 
sensitive to legislative and temperature requirements. As for retailing, in the UK trends were 
dictated by what was happening in the move from high street to out of town shopping, 
leading to huge changes in supply chain management. By experiencing and learning from 
both, Exe1 Logistics had developed strengths that they wanted to export overseas, but above 
all they have built on the need for flexibility. 
NFC’s target of reaching 50% of its revenue from overseas business by 1995, appears to be 
on course. These overseas earnings are derived from all its divisions, not just Distribution. 
But with Exe1 Logistics earning approx 40% of its income from overseas (1992) whilst at the 
same time providing 47Oh of NFC profits, this represents almost 20% of overseas revenue for 
its parent company from Exe1 Logistics alone. 
CURRENT POSITION 
As a supplier of distribution and logistics services, within a changing industry, the open 
employee participative culture within Exe1 Logistics encourages the implementation of new 
ideas and innovation. Over 90% of the employees own shares in the company and thus have 
a personal interest in its success. They have pioneered ways of handling complex logistic and 
distribution tasks for major companies like Argos, Marks and Spencer, Tesco and Whitbread 
and give individual attention to large customers eg Exel Logistics - Storeflow took over the 
Storehouse warehousing operation. All Storehouses 900 staff at 3 locations were switched to 
the new company on Exel Logistics’ terms of employment. Close co-operatation with existing 
staff has led to easier transitions and acceptance of the new company culture leads to high 
levels of loyalty and commitment - something Martyn Pellew sees as essential for growth. 
“The employees are encouraged by a company culture that enables individuals to 
contribute new ideas and help to implement them”. 
Growth in the UK has continued and in 1991 the company received awards for 
implementing successful environmental policies from the Worshipful Company of Marketeers 
and trade magazine Motor Transport. The company’s commitment to quality of customer 
service has been recognised through the application of the “Quest for Excellence” quality 
campaign, culminating in 1992, with 12 sites being awarded the international quality 
standard IS0 9002. 
Exe1 Logistics has become one of the major supply chain service providers in the UK, USA 
and mainland Europe with a turnover in 1993 of f 717 million and over 220 depots 
worldwide. Growth by acquisition alone will not be enough to ensure success, either in 
Europe or the USA. With an initial and fast growing presence in Spain, France, Holland and 
Germany, the company is now faced with yet more choices if it is to become a truly 
international or even global brand. 
And it appears that Exel Logistics does intend to pursue globalisation, possibly via their 
larger clients own expansion - Robbie Burns MD:- 
“By the end of the decade I expect us to be roughly three times our present size. 
We’ll be market leaders in Western Europe and have a presence in Australasia, the 
Far East and Eastern Europe”.[3] 
CONCLUSIONS 
Exel Logistics have had to come to terms very quickly with the major changes affecting the 
distribution industry (both in the UK and Europe) as well as grow their brand and market 
their service in a changing marketplace, during a recession and in many different cultures. 
All things considered they have performed and evolved very successfully and in adopting a 
specific strategic approach they quickly dominated the domestic market and achieved 
expansion both in N. America and Europe. In a relatively short period of time they have 
gone a long way towards becoming a successful international logistics operator, but they still 
have many questions to address, for example:- 
- do they continue to buy more and/or bigger acquisitions, 
- strive to complete a linked network of food businesses in Europe, 
- go for organic growth, 
- follow existing customers into new countries, 
- should they become more proactive, 
- move into non-food sectors, 
- expand on a greenfield bases, 
- concentrate on the home market and/or the USA, 
- offer shared user services. 
_- 
Following a strategic review late in 1993, NFC announced that Exel Logsitics was to merge 
with its sister company BRS. This move, accompanied by a rights issue was aimed at giving 
NFC the flexibility to continue its tradition of “bolt on” acquisitions - possibly with more 
European expansion in mind. It is unclear whether this is a move to further the company’s 
global aspirations, if it is, they must now decide what strategies to pursue to achieve this 
aim. 
_- 
See also CONCLUSIONS in the second Working Paper refered to earlier “The Changing 
Marketplace for Distribution: Implications for Exe1 Logistics”. 
NOTE: 
There are two case studies resulting from the work done with Exe1 Logistics. 
Case A - The Marketing of a Distribution Brand. 
This looks at the position NFC found themselves in at the time of the company’s flotation on the Stock Exchange. In 
particular the problems facing the new MD and Marketing Director in pulling together so many diverse brands from 
their existing portfolio. 
Case B - Internationalising a Distribution Brand. 
With the launch of the umbrella brand, Exe1 Logistics, this cane outlines the growth of the company, mainly by 
acquisition in North America and Europe, and looks at the strategic options open to them if they are to pursue their 
aim of becoming a global company. 
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